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Due to opaque information and weak enforcement in emerging loan markets, the need for 
collateral is high, whereas borrowers lack adequate assets to pledge as collateral. How is this 
puzzle solved? We find for a representative sample from Northeast Thailand that indeed most 
loans do not include any tangible assets as collateral. Instead, lenders enforce collateral-free 
loans through third-party guarantees and relationship lending, but also through modifying 
loan terms, such as reducing loan size. Guarantees are the relatively most important substitute, 
they reduce collateral requirements independently of relationship lending and they are more 
often used by formal financial institutions. 
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1  Introduction 
Collateral is a regular ingredient of risky lending. It serves to limit potential losses for 
lenders and serves as an incentive mechanism and commitment signal for borrowers. Because 
of these functions it plays an important role in loan markets. Accordingly collateral is part of 
many if not most (business) loan contracts in mature markets (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 
2009). Due to opaque information and weak enforcement, theory suggests that the request for 
collateral is even higher in less developed markets (Bae and Goyal 2009, Behr et al. 2011, 
Hainz, 2003, Menkhoff et al., 2006). This high importance of collateral results into a problem 
for relatively poor borrowers in emerging markets: collateral requirements are expected to be 
particularly high but their ability to provide collateral is comparatively low. How do borrowers 
and lenders get along with this problem? 
In principle, there may be two possibilities: first, collateral requirements are similar to 
requirements in mature markets so that poor households or entrepreneurs who lack adequate 
assets to pledge as collateral will be credit-rationed; second, conventional collateral is not 
necessary and lenders can issue some credit without collateral. In the latter case, the follow-up 
question  is  then  how  can  a  lender  enforce  a  collateral-free  loan,  are  there  substitutes  to 
collateral?  Is  it  third  party  guarantees,  pledged  savings,  other  contractual  features,  close 
relationships or interpersonal trust that serve as collateral substitutes? As limited access to 
finance is constraining growth and welfare (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008, 2008a) it seems 
important to learn about possible credit rationing induced by missing collateral and ways to 
overcome the threatening lack of collateral. 
Despite  the  obvious  relevance  of  lacking  collateral  for  a  very  large  share  of  the 
population  in  emerging  countries,  there  is  not  much  evidence  available.  Earlier  studies 
documenting  the  use  of  collateral  concentrate  on  mature  markets.  Studies  on  developing 
countries, however, are often narrow in their coverage, either with respect to target group, 
financial  institutions  or  their  information  about  borrowers  and  lending  terms.  In  order  to 
provide  comprehensive  evidence  we  have  conducted  a  household  survey  in  Northeastern 
Thailand  in  2007.  This  survey  covers  2,186  rural  households  from  which  we  receive 
information about household, demographic and in particular financial details; one should note 
that these households also operate as small entrepreneurs and that loans are accordingly used 
for production and consumption purposes, respectively. The three provinces of our sample are 3 
 
 
selected in order to differ in economic conditions. Moreover, Thailand’s rural areas are served 
by  a  variety  of  financial  institutions  (see  Kaboski  and  Townsend,  2005,  Siamwalla  et  al., 
1990). All this provides welcome depth and diversity to our data set. 
This data allows to empirically analyzing the above introduced “collateral puzzle” in 
emerging  markets:  first,  we  lay  foundations  by  documenting  the  importance  of  collateral, 
second,  we  analyze  the  determinants  of  collateral  including  considering  substitutes  to 
collateral,  and,  third,  we  examine  the  use  of  the  most  important  collateral  substitutes. 
Regarding the importance of collateral we find that only about 15% of the 1,671 loans in our 
sample are secured by various forms of collateral. Although there is some variation in cross-
sections, such as household groups or borrowing purposes, the share of collateralized loans is 
consistently  small  throughout  and  does  not  exceed  25%.  Moreover,  the  share  of  credit-
constrained households is low at 11%, strongly indicating that lenders rely on substitutes to 
collateral in enforcing their interests. 
This empirical research is the first, according to best of our knowledge, to systematically 
consider several substitutes to collateral in order to fully understand the role of collateral in 
lending  to  poor  borrowers  in  emerging  markets.  We  do  indeed  find  that  collateral  is 
significantly  less  often  required  if  there  is  either  a  third  party  guarantee  or  a  case  of 
relationship lending. The use of collateral is also related to other loan terms where collateral 
obviously serves to reduce the lender’s risk: more collateral is required for larger loans, for 
longer  loan  duration  and  for  lower  interest  rates.  As  a  third  group  of  determinants  we 
investigate household characteristics and possible default risk with little success. It is only 
better education that is related to less collateral requirements. 
As the data set unusually covers two important collateral substitutes, i.e. guarantees and 
relationship  lending,  we  are  able  to  examine  their  use  in  the  same  market.  We  find  that 
guarantees are relatively more important, that both substitutes work independently of each 
other and tend to substitute each other, that guarantees are relatively more important at formal 
financial institutions and that the marginal effect of these substitutes is independent of loan 
size. These findings extend recent literature emphasizing the importance of either guarantees 
or  relationship  lending  in  less  developed  markets  as  means  to  overcome  information  and 
incentive problems. 
We are not aware that there is an earlier study on emerging markets where all these 
determinants of the use of collateral – including substitutes to the use of collateral – were 
considered within a unified approach. Closest in coverage is Ono and Uesugi (2009) for small 
firms in Japan where, however, collateral is very widely used and thus plays another role than 4 
 
 
in  our  case.  Usually,  studies  rely  on  a  subset  of  the  following  determinants:  guarantees, 
relationship, loan term and borrower characteristics. Our study shows, however, that all of 
these groups of determinants are important in analyzing the use of collateral and thus should 
not be missed in empirical work. 
The paper is organized in four more sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
theoretical  and  empirical  literature  which  shapes  expectations  to  be  examined.  Section  3 
informs about the data used in this study and the characteristics of borrowers and lenders in 
the rural areas. In Section 4 we examine the use of collateral by descriptive statistics. The 
hypotheses on the determinants of collateral are tested by multivariate analyses in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2  Literature review 
Our literature review aims for preparing expectations on the use of collateral in lending 
in  emerging  markets.  We  are  thus  selective  in  coverage.  Section  2.1  addresses  theoretical 
literature in order to derive hypotheses of interest, whereas Section 2.2 deals with respective 
empirical work in order to identify gaps in research. 
 
2.1 Theoretical literature 
The use of collateral has been mostly explained by theories of asymmetric information 
which show that collateralization reduces ex ante problems of adverse selection and ex post 
frictions  such  as  moral  hazard.  Collateralization  thus  serves  as  a  means  to  reduce  credit 
rationing (review in Berger et al. 2011a, 2011b, Coco, 2000). First, it induces a borrower to 
reveal his or her default risk, acting as a signaling device (Bester, 1985, Besanko and Thakor, 
1987). Second, it provides the borrower with an incentive to exert effort and reveal truthfully 
the state of his project after having obtained the loan (Bester, 1987, 1994). Both arguments 
apply above all to outside collateral, where the lender has right of access to personal assets 
outside  the  firm.
1  The  potential  loss  of  personal  assets  makes  a  signal  more  credible  and 
improves the incentive to repay the loan. By contrast, inside collateral, where assets inside the 
firm are pledged as collateral, serves to reduce conflicts of interest between multiple lenders 
by providing a priority of debt claims. If the borrower lacks inside and outside collateral, loans 
may be secured by third party guarantees. They help to reduce the lender’s potential loss, but 
                                                            
1 A personal guarantee represents a more general claim on personal wealth and places fewer 
restrictions on the guarantee’s use of this wealth than the pledge of a specific personal asset (Avery et 
al. 1998, p.1026). 5 
 
 
do not solve the moral hazard problem. If the third party is better able to monitor and control 
the borrower’s actions than the lender is, the use of third party guarantees has some economic 
advantage. Accordingly, these so-called borrower-based theories (Jiménez et al., 2009) predict 
that the use of collateral varies across loans according to the characteristics of borrowers, 
loans, and bank-borrower relationships, which affect information asymmetries between both 
parties about the credit risk of the loan. 
Further theories on the use of collateral reach beyond our objective. First, lender-based 
theories  postulate  that  collateral  serves  to  increase  the  lender’s  profit  or  expected  return 
(Binswanger, 1982). Profits may increase due to a bank’s market power (Hainz, 2003) or due 
to its information advantage over distant lenders in evaluating credit risk (Inderst and Mueller, 
2007). As we do not observe local banking market structures, we do not directly test lender-
based theories. Second, there are theories predicting the use of collateral due to legal variables 
and the efficiency of the legal system (La Porta et al., 1998). These theories require cross-
country data and are thus also beyond our objective. Third, following the lazy bank hypothesis 
(Manove  et  al.,  2001),  high  collateralization  weakens  the  bank’s  incentive  to  evaluate  the 
profitability of an investment project. Testing this theory requires time-series data which we 
do not have. 
Collateral  may  be  substituted  by  other  mechanisms  to  reduce  credit  risk  and 
informational asymmetry, such as strength of the lending relationship, loan maturity, loan size 
and  covenants.  The  role  of  relationship  strength  in  reducing  problems  of  asymmetric 
information has been extensively discussed in the literature (for an overview see Boot, 2000). 
The more recent discussion focuses on differences between relationship lending and asset-
based lending as two alternative lending technologies (Berger and Udell, 2006, Egli et al., 
2006). Relationship lending relies on soft or private information about borrower risk obtained 
through  a  close  bank-borrower  relationship  and  involves  the  use  of  outside  collateral.  In 
contrast,  asset-based  lending,  being  more  transactions  oriented  relies  on  hard  or  public 
information  and  uses  the  assets  inside  the  firm  as  collateral  (Brick  and  Palia,  2009). 
Relationship lending dominates in economies where the likelihood of strategic default is high 
because  of  an  underdeveloped  financial  system  with  low  transparency  and  weak  legal 
enforcement (Egli et al., 2006). 
As exactly this applies to emerging markets, one expects that relationship lending with 
its preferred reliance on outside collateral is wide-spread. It follows that the discussion based 
on different consequences derived from the use of inside collateral (see Longhofer and Santos, 
2000) versus outside collateral (see  Boot  and Thakor, 1994) is less relevant for our case. 6 
 
 
Potentially very relevant for the situation of an emerging country is, however, the proprietary 
information  gained  by  the  relationship  lender.  This  information  increases  its  ex  post 
bargaining power to the detriment of the borrower (Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1992). Because the 
borrower is locked-in, collateral requirements may be positively related to the intensity of the 
lending relationship. Thus, collateral is the result of holdup. At the same time, it causes hold-
up: since an asset can be pledged only once, and is costly to evaluate, switching to other banks 
would involve high costs. 
Among  loan  terns,  charging  a  higher  interest  rate  is  a  standard  measure  to  prepare 
against default risk. Loan duration is a means to reduce asymmetric information problems. 
Shorter loan durations provide additional information and reduce the moral hazard problem. 
The shorter the loan duration the lower is the opportunity and incentive for the borrower to 
switch from low-risk to high-risk projects (so-called asset substitution problem). Short-term 
loans  may  also  reduce  the  adverse  selection  problem  by  serving  as  signaling  instruments. 
Thus,  short-term  loans  and  collateral  are  substitutes  and  loan  duration  is  expected  to  be 
positively related to the use of collateral (Ortíz and Penas, 2008, Steijvers and Voordeckers, 
2009). 
Similarly, moral hazard can be reduced by reducing the loan volume, since a larger loan 
amount tends to increase the incentive for default. Larger loans tend to be riskier than smaller 
loans,  since  they  increase  firm  leverage  and  thus  default  probability  (Steijvers  and 
Voordeckers, 2009). Moreover, the contracting costs of collateralization may be too high for 
small loans. Therefore, the use of collateral is expected to increase with loan size. 
Restrictive covenants are a further contractual device to reduce moral hazard and adverse 
selection and may therefore be a substitute to collateral (for an overview see Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009). For a mature market it has been shown that small business loans with real 
estate collateral less frequently contain covenants, but that smaller and manager-controlled 
firms  are  less  likely  to  have  covenants  in  their  loans  (Niskanen  and  Niskanen  2004). 
Restrictive covenants are less useful for the smallest firms as these borrowers do not have 
audited financial statements or do not provide feasible financial information (Ortíz and Penas, 
2008, Niskanen and Niskanen, 2004). In emerging markets with weak contract enforcement 
covenants are expected to be less efficient. This may explain why they are not present in our 
sample of loans to very small businesses in Thailand.  
As  borrower  characteristics  affecting  the  use  of  collateral  most  of  the  literature  has 
discussed size, age and legal form of the firm. Small and young firms tend be more opaque 
than  larger  and  older  firms,  because  potential  lenders  have  less  information  on  their 7 
 
 
investment  opportunities  or  managerial  capabilities.  Credit  risk  tends  to  be  higher  in 
corporations  than  in  unincorporated  firms,  which  makes  outside  collateral  particularly 
necessary there. In our case, these firm characteristics are not relevant. As our dataset covers 
information  about  loans  to  households,  which  are  mostly  used  for  productive  purposes, 
borrower risk may depend on demographic and socio-economic characteristics, such as age, 
gender, education and wealth of the household head or self-employed person. If, however, the 
production loans to households are interpreted as loans to unincorporated firms, the borrowing 
purpose may be relevant to explain the low incidence of collateral. Since in the case of self-
employed persons, personal assets can be used for business as well as private purposes, the 
distinction  between  inside  and  outside  collateral  may  not  be  useful  here  (Neuberger  and 
Räthke, 2009). In fact, personal assets of small business owners are often pledged as collateral. 
Additionally, the owners of small businesses may have their personal wealth at stake to repay 
loans, because they are organized as proprietorships and partnerships with unlimited liability 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). This is likely to apply to our case of self-employed Thai households. 
Finally,  the  use  of  collateral  may  depend  on  the  type  of  loan  sought.  Loans  with 
nonspecific use such as credit lines or consumption loans are riskier and therefore may be 
more often secured by personal commitments and require more soft information than is the 
case of specific investments in machinery (Avery et al., 1998, Chakraborty and Hu, 2006). In 
countries with weak protection of property rights, lenders tend to prefer loans for specific 
purposes such as investments in physical assets (Bae and Goyal, 2009). This might explain 
why the production loans in our sample do not include lines of credit. 
In  summary,  borrower-based  theories  on  the  use  of  collateral  predict  that  borrower 
characteristics, loan terms and relationship will play a role. In the case of household loans, 
borrower  characteristics  affecting  credit  risk  and  information  opacity  are  determined  by 
demographic  and  socio-economic  household  variables.  Loan  terms  should  have  the  above 
derived effects. Regarding relationship or guarantees we expect some empirical relevance as 
the costs of evaluating and utilizing inside collateral may be prohibitively high in the case of 
very small loans in not fully developed markets. 
 
2.2 Empirical literature 
The empirical literature is largely in line with theoretical predictions (overview in Berger 
et al., 2011a, 2011b, Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009, see also Degryse et al., 2009). Most 
studies  find  that  observed  borrower  risk  positively  affects  collateralization,  and  that  the 
incidence  and  degree  of  collateral  tends  to  be  highest  for  young  and  small  firms.  These 8 
 
 
findings support the risk reduction and monitoring role of collateral. Evidence in favor of the 
signaling  role  of  collateral  is  less  clear,  because  studies  that  find  a  negative  relationship 
between borrower risk and collateral (Jiménez et al., 2006, Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001) do 
not isolate effects of ex ante private information from ex post incentive problems (Berger et 
al., 2011a, 2011b). Recent studies that differentiate between private and public information 
show  that  the  use  of  credit  scoring  technology  by  lenders,  reducing  ex  ante  private 
information, reduces the incidence of collateral (Berger et al., 2011a), but that the ex ante 
private information theories seem to hold only for customers with relatively short relations to 
the lender (Berger et al. 2011b). The results about the relation between collateral and strength 
of  the  lending  relationship  are  mixed;  in  the  Japanese  market  for  small  firm  lending,  for 
example, collateral is used by related banks as an incentive for monitoring effort and thus is an 
alternative  to  guarantees  (Ono  and  Uesugi,  2009).  All  studies  that  included  loan  duration 
found a positive influence on the use of collateral (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). 
The majority of studies focuses on mature US and European markets, while the evidence 
about the role of collateral in emerging and less developed markets is scarce. In transition 
countries, collateral plays a larger role than in developed ones, which might be explained by 
higher  information  asymmetries,  a  lower  liquidation  payoff,  or  lower  banking  market 
competition (Hainz, 2003). Interestingly, small firms in transition countries are less likely to 
pledge collateral than medium-sized firms. The important role for collateral is supported by La 
Porta et al. (2003) for Mexico, Menkhoff et al. (2006) for Thai commercial banks and Allen et 
al. (2005) for private sector loans in China. As a side-aspect Thai banks’ customers are likely 
to be locked-in as housebanks demand extra collateral. The high collateral requirements in 
China  do  not  seem  to  restrain  growth  of  the  private  sector,  because  firms  use  alternative 
financing mechanisms relying strongly on reputation and relationships (Allen et al. 2005). Lin 
(2011) finds a limited role of collateral in overcoming asymmetric information in China due to 
weakly protected creditor rights. Recently, Liberti and Mian (2010) show for a cross section of 
small  business  loans  in  15  emerging  countries  that  the  cost  of  collateral  in  terms  of  the 
collateral  amount  and  the  specificity  of  assets  pledged  as  collateral  decline  sharply  with 
financial development. In more developed markets, firms may pledge a broader range of firm-
specific assets as collateral (e.g. inventory instead of non-firm specific land), because better 
legal and creditor rights protection enables banks to seize and liquidate specialized forms of 
assets more efficiently. 
All previously mentioned studies refer to business loans. Complementing this literature 
there are studies about microfinance institutions in developing countries, thus covering very 9 
 
 
small enterprises and households, i.e. an institutional environment close to our study (Conning 
and Udry, 2007, Hermes and Lensink, 2007). It is revealing that most of these studies do not 
focus  on  collateral  but  rather  on  other  means,  in  particular  guarantees,  to  make  loans 
enforceable  (e.g.  Besley  and  Coate,  1995,  Fafchamps  and  Lund,  2003).  Guarantees  are 
embedded in the lending process in various forms, such as group lending where all group 
members  serve  as  guarantors  or  cosigned  lending  where  the  specific  cosigners  serve  as 
guarantors (Bond and Rai, 2008). Guarantees do not only shield the lender but they may also 
impact  the  behavior  of  the  borrower  (Klonner  and  Rai,  2010).  Only  for  commercial 
microlending in Mozambique, it has been shown that collateral is relevant and is a substitute 
to  relationships:  the  microlenders  pass  on  informational  gains  to  the  borrowers  via  lower 
collateral requirements for successive loans, from which the most opaque firms profit most 
(Behr et al. 2011). 
We learn from the empirical literature regarding the importance of collateral that there 
are two counterbalancing  effects: collateral  requirements are  relatively higher in  emerging 
than in mature markets but they may be very low for small firms and households because of an 
outright  lack  of  useable  collateral.  Regarding  collateral  determinants,  we  learn  that  other 
means  of  enforcement  (than  collateral)  are  expected  to  be  important  and  thus  need  to  be 
considered; in addition loan terns may play a role. 
 
3  Data and description of borrowers and lenders 
3.1  Data compilation 
The data used in this analysis is based on a household survey conducted in 2007 in three 
provinces in the Northeast region of Thailand. The survey is part of the project “Impact of 
shocks on the vulnerability to poverty: consequences for development of emerging Southeast 
Asian  economies”  (FOR  756),  funded  by  the  German  Research  Foundation  (DFG).  The 
Northeast region is particularly interesting for our study because it is often considered the 
poorest  region  with  limited  access  to  formal  financial  markets  and  with  various  types  of 
informal lenders operating in this area. 
A three stage sampling design was used to select the households. Within each of the 
three  provinces,  sub-districts  were  first  randomly  selected  with  probability  proportional  to 
population  density.  Then  within  each  sub-district,  two  villages  were  chosen  at  random. 
Finally, within each village, 10 households are randomly selected. In total, the survey covers 
2,186 households from 220 villages in 110 sub-districts of the three provinces. Due to the 10 
 
 
sampling  process  this  survey  is  largely  representative  for  rural  households  in  Northeast 
Thailand. More details on sample selection of the survey are available on request. 
The  data  set  contains  detailed  information  on  household  characteristics  and  their 
activities profile for the reference period May 2006 to April 2007. Our data set is particularly 
rich in financial data, including borrowing, savings, lending, credit denials, loan defaults and 
related credit contracts.  
 
3.2  Description of borrowers 
Table 1 presents the sample means and standard deviations for some of the selected 
variables for different income groups. Households are classified into three income groups: the 
low-income, the middle-income and the high-income
2. 
There seems to be little difference between the income groups with respect to household 
demographic  characteristics.  The  average  family  size  is  3.98  persons  or  2.83  in  adult 
equivalent  units
3.  The  level  of  educational  attainment  for  these  households  is  low,  as  the 
average year of schooling for the head of household is only 5 years. However the proportion of 
households  with  more  than  secondary  education  is  higher  in  the  high-income  group.  The 
majority of households are farmers in all income groups. Nevertheless formal employment and 
non-farm self-employment are more important in the high-income group. 
Households with different income levels tend to differ with regard to wealth variables. 
Whereas differences between the low-income and the middle-income group are in general not 
large, the high-income group, by contrast, differs significantly in income, consumption and 
assets. In particular, land ownership, consumption expenditures and assets are almost twice as 
much for this group as for the other two groups. It seems interesting to note that even low 
income households possess a remarkable stock of assets which may be important as a source 
for collateral. However, the numbers grossly overestimate the usefulness of these assets for the 
purpose of collateral: first, the average figures are higher than median, which is about one 
third lower. Second, about 70% of assets consist of land and buildings which are not easily 
marketable. Many landholding documents fall into the categories of so-called “Sor Por Kor” 
and “NS2” which cannot be sold to lenders. If land can be sold legally, it may be difficult to 
do so because the legal system works slowly and even if lenders gain land rights it may be 
                                                            
2 A household is classified as low-income if the annual household income per adult equivalent unit falls 
below the Northeast poverty line, which is 15,792 Baht/person or equivalently 1,316 Baht/person per 
month. A household is classified as middle-income if income is above the poverty line but below twice 
the poverty line, and as high-income if income is above twice the poverty line.  
3 We use the OECD adult equivalence scale which assigns the weight of 1.0 for the first adult member, 
0.7 to each additional adult, and 0.5 to each child. 11 
 
 
difficult to use them effectively as long as the borrowers are still in place. Third, marketability 
of durable goods is very low as these goods are typically used items. Overall, the existence of 
assets does not ensure a solid basis for useful collateral. 
Regarding household borrowings, the data reveals that these households exhibit a high 
degree of borrowing, as more than 70 percent of the households have taken some loans during 
the  reference  period.  Moreover  having  multiple  loans  contracted  by  one  household  is  not 
uncommon,  as  the  average  number  of  loans  per  household  is  about  1.5  loans.  Significant 
differences  also  occur  between  the  income  groups  with  respect  to  household  borrowing. 
Whereas there are no big differences in the number of loans between the three groups, the 
amount of loans differs significantly. The high-income households borrow almost twice as 
much as the low and middle income households, suggesting that the high-income households 
can  obtain  loans  with  larger  size  than  the  low  and  middle-income  households.  When  we 
consider loan amount relative to household income, we find that the low-income households 
have  the  largest  loan-income  ratio,  and  that  the  loan-income  ratio  tends  to  decrease  with 
household income. As for the interest rate, the low income households pay a much higher 
interest rate as compared to the middle and high-income households. The incidences of credit 
rationing
4 and loan default are low for the three types of households and are not statistically 
different. However, poorer households are more likely to face credit denials. 
In summary, we find that a large number of rural households have access to the credit 
markets  and  that  the  poor  are  not  statistically  different  from  the  rich  in  terms  of  credit 
rationing. Both observations seem to be inconsistent with the expectation that the poor who 
lack adequate assets will be credit rationed. Later, we shall find that the large quantity of loans 
is provided without land or any tangible assets as collateral, because there are substitutes. 
 
3.3  Description of lenders 
This section gives a brief overview of the financial institutions that operate in the rural 
area. The credit market in Thailand is characterized by a diverse set of lenders; some are 
formal,  some  are  informal  and  some  are  considered  in  between.  These  lenders  have 
characteristics that are distinct from one another. Instead of dividing these lenders into two 
major categories – the formal and informal sectors, we group these different lenders into seven 
categories which are described next. Ranked in descending order of formality, the first is 
commercial banks and state owned banks (CB). Commercial banks and state owned banks are 
                                                            
4 Full rationing means that a loan is denied and partial rationing means that a smaller loan is supplied 
than requested. 12 
 
 
the largest banks in the country following a business model mainly serving larger customers, 
needing for example larger loans. Moreover, they tend to rely on advanced infrastructure, such 
as larger branches. According to this specialization they play a minor role in the more remote 
areas  covered  by  our  study.  The  second  is  the  Bank  for  Agriculture  and  Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC). BAAC was established in 1966 as a government owned agricultural 
development  bank.  Most  of  the  loans  issued  by  BAAC  are  for  agricultural  production 
purposes.  BAAC  normally  does  not  require  collateral  in  the  form  of  land  ownership  and 
tangible assets but rather in the form of guarantor and joint liability. Among all banks – public 
and private banks – BAAC has the largest number of branches. The third is the village funds 
(VF) program. This was initiated in 2001 following the spirit of other microfinance programs. 
It is also promoted as an attempt to improve access to credit for the poor. Under this program, 
a separate fund was established in every village and the government injected 1 million Baht 
into each fund. The loan application is decided by the village fund committee selected by 
village members. The fourth is community-based organizations including cooperatives, rice 
banks, buffalo banks, savings and credit groups (CRED). Typically these cooperatives and 
credit groups are organized and administered by the local community. The fifth is policy loans 
(POLICY) with a narrow focus and at subsidized lending conditions, mainly the “Student Loan 
Fund” and the “Poverty Eradication Scheme”.
5 The sixth is professional money lenders (ML), 
including pawnshops and traders. Finally the seventh is relatives and friends (RELA). 
Table  2  describes  the  lending  business  of  these  lending  institutions.  It  is  clear  that 
BAAC and VF are the most important sources of credit in rural areas. Based on the survey 
data, 3,298 loans are made in 2006 - 2007, among which 43 percent are from VF and 23 
percent are from BAAC. In terms of credit volume, BAAC dominates the credit market in 
Northeast Thailand due to its relatively large loan size with a share of 38 percent. Next in 
importance  are  VF,  CRED,  ML  and  RELA.  As  may  be  expected,  CB  and  POLICY  play 
relatively smaller roles in the rural areas, both in terms of number of loans and credit volume.  
The variation in loan characteristics across lenders is remarkable. The formal financial 
institutions  (CB  and  BAAC)  provide  larger  loans  whereas  the  more  informal  institutions 
                                                            
5 The student loan fund and the poverty eradication scheme are treated as separate lending institution as 
these programs are quite distinct from other institutions in terms of the target groups, the usage of the 
loan, and the interest rate charged. The two programs provide 0-1% interest rate loans to households 
with income below 15,000 Baht/person/year (approximately US$ 375/person/year). For the poverty 
eradication scheme, not all households and villages are eligible for the fund. Only low-income 
households (below 15,000 Baht/person/year) living in villages with the proportion of low-income 
households higher than 30% are eligible. With regard to the use of loan, the student loan fund provides 
loans for education only while the poverty eradication scheme gives loans for production purpose. 
They are managed by government offices which also assess eligibility, approve and monitor the loan.   13 
 
 
provide loans with smaller size. Among informal lenders, ML provides relatively larger loans 
than the others. CB, POLICY and BAAC tend to provide loans with longer duration than the 
others.  There  are  great  variations  in  interest  rates  within  lending  institutions  and  between 
lending  institutions.  Nevertheless  some  patterns  can  be  derived.  The  groups  of  lending 
institutions that typically charge low interest rates are POLICY, RELA and VF. We note that 
while the average interest rate for RELA is higher than for VF, nearly 70 percent of these 
loans  are  given  at  zero  interest.  BAAC  and  CRED  are  also  relatively  “cheap”  but  more 
expensive than VF, whereas CB and ML charge comparatively high interest rates. 
All these lending institutions seem to have their own market niche with respect to the 
purpose  of  borrowing.  The  more  formal  lending  institutions  lend  disproportionately  for 
production whereas the more informal ones lend more for consumption loans. Interestingly, 
ML  and  RELA  seem  to  be  used  for  shock-related  borrowing
6  more  than  other  lending 
institutions.  
The  lending  institutions  are  also  likely  to  differ  with  respect  to  their  lending 
technologies.  We  expect  that  the  more  formal  lending  institutions  use  more  asset-based 
lending with hard information, while the informal ones, being closer to their customers, rely 
on relationship lending with soft information. Whether this can be seen in different collateral 
requirements will be examined below. 
 
4  The use of collateral: descriptive statistics 
4.1  The incidence and degree of collateral: aggregated view 
In  our  sample,  the  incidence  of  collateral  is  surprisingly  low,  while  the  degree  of 
collateral is high. Only 15% of loans are secured by collateral, but the mean collateral value is 
clearly above 100% of the loan volume. The degree of collateralization is much higher than 
that observed for business loans in previous studies (for an overview see Menkhoff et al., 
2006). In a sample of loans to small, medium and large firms in Thailand the mean collateral 
value as percentage of loan volume was 53%, in a sample of loans to large private firms in 
China it was 83% (Allen et al., 2005), and in a sample of loans to SMEs in 15 emerging 
economies  it  was  54%  (Liberti  and  Mian,  2010).  However,  collateral  values  much  above 
100% of the loan volume have been reported also by small firms in the UK with 16 employees 
as median number (Cowling, 1999). Thus, the high collateral volume in our sample may be 
explained  by  the  small  size  of  the  borrowing  household-enterprises  rather  than  by  the 
                                                            
6 Shock-related borrowings are loans that are taken to absorb income shocks caused by e.g. unplanned 
higher household expenditures, retirement, bad year for household’s business, higher input prices or 
investment costs, lower crop prices, bad weather, or illness. 14 
 
 
environment of an emerging market. However, a comparison of reported collateral values may 
be biased because some samples are based on bank-internal data (e.g. Liberti and Mian, 2010, 
Menkhoff et al., 2006), while others (e.g. Cowling, 1999 and the present sample) are based on 
a survey of borrowers. The liquidation value of collateral is usually lower for the bank than for 
the borrower.  
In the present sample, the dominating form of  securing loans is third-party personal 
guarantees,  which  are  pledged  in  71%  of  the  loan  cases.  Thus,  although  loans  to  rural 
households in Thailand are rarely collateralized by tangible assets, they are unsecured in only 
14%  of  the  cases.  To  examine  whether  this  differs  from  the  incidence  of  collateral  and 
guarantees  observed  in  other  countries,  we  need  data  about  collateral  and  guarantees  for 
comparable loans to households or microenterprises. However, these are largely missing. To 
our knowledge, the only publicly available dataset that indicates whether and how each small 
business  loan  is  secured  by  collateral  or  guarantees  is  the  US  National  Survey  of  Small 
Business Finance (NSSBF). It is not well suited for our purpose, because it includes only 
nonagricultural firms with fewer than 500 employees and tends to underrepresent smaller and 
unincorporated firms (Avery et al., 1998). However, the US Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF), which includes information on businesses owned by households and underrepresents 
larger  firms  cannot  be  used  for  comparison  with  our  data,  because  information  on 
collateralized  loans  is  provided  only  for  the  firm  or  household  as  a  whole  and  not  for 
individual loans. Therefore, we use information from previous studies based on the NSSBF 
survey  and  other  surveys  about  the  incidence  of  collateral  and  guarantees  at  loans  to 
unincorporated  firms, microenterprises, small firms and consumers. Table 3 represents the 
results compared with those of the present sample. We find that the incidence of collateral is 
lower, but the probability of pledging personal guarantees is clearly higher for households in 
Thailand than for micro or small enterprises in mature markets. This seems to be due to a lack 
of collateral assets or lower costs of using personal guarantees instead. 
All in all, we do not find support for the hypothesis that the incidence and degree of 
collateral is higher for loans to households in Thailand than for loans to micro and small 
enterprises in mature markets. To find out possible explanations, we take a disaggregated 
view.  
 
4.2  The use of collateral: disaggregated views 
The use of collateral may depend on the source of loan, household wealth, borrowing 
purpose and interest rate or other loan terms. We describe the use of collateral by different 15 
 
 
lending institutions, income groups, borrowing purposes and terms of credit contracts in order 
to draw some inferences about their relationships. 
 
(a)  Collateral by lending institution 
The types of assets that are commonly accepted as collateral are land, durable goods, 
savings, future crop, and gold. We classify the types of collateral into three groups: land, other 
assets and no collateral. Table 4 shows the types of collateral accepted by different lending 
institutions. We see that all types of lending institutions issue some loans without any tangible 
assets as collateral. Even for the formal lending institutions such as CB and BAAC, nearly 65 
percent of their loans is given without collateral
7. The corresponding figures for the informal 
lenders are between 60 - 98 percent. Not all loans are collateral-free; in general formal lending 
institutions rely more on land collateral (about 35 percent of the loans from CB and BAAC) 
compared  with  the  informal  ones.  Also,  a  considerable  number  of  loans  from  CRED  (15 
percent) and ML (47 percent) are backed by land or asset substitutes. The exception is RELA 
which typically requires no collateral. As informal lenders tend to have stronger relationships 
with their borrowers, these observations are consistent with the hypothesis that collateral is 
negatively related to the strength of the lending relationship. 
Finally we find that the ratio of the value of collateral to loan size is very high overall. 
On average, the value of collateral is more than twice the value of loan. The proportion of 
more than fully collateralized loans is in the range of 50 percent to 100 percent. The high 
collateral  ratio  may  have  resulted  from  the  low  marketability  of  collateral,  the  difference 
between  the  lender  and  the  borrower  valuation  of  collateral,  the  restrictive  collateral 
requirements by lenders, and the indivisibility in collateral. 
 
(b)  Collateral by income of household  
Table  5  describes  the  types  of  collateral  for  different  income  groups.  Collateral 
requirements overall show a small variation across income groups, much less than they did 
across lending institutions. There are no dramatic differences between the income groups with 
respect to the types of collateral and the collateral to loan ratio. This is partly due to the fact 
that many households have multiple loans from multiple sources at the same time. In our data, 
we find that several high-income households borrow from the informal lenders like CRED, 
                                                            
7 State owned banks engage in two types of lending. The first is the typical lending to persons who are 
required to provide land collateral or a third party guarantee, usually guarantee from a government 
official. The second involves special policy loans which are disbursed via the state owned banks. In the 
latter case, collateral requirements may be waived or substituted by a third party guarantee.   16 
 
 
ML and RELA. Nevertheless we note that the proportion of loans without any collateral is 
slightly higher for the low and the middle-income households compared with the high-income 
households. This is quite consistent with the finding that the poor pay higher interest rates than 
the rich. In other words, the poor do not have adequate assets to pledge as collateral; having no 
collateral security, the lender charges high rates on these loans to increase his interest income 
as a buffer against defaults. 
 
(c)  Collateral by borrowing purpose  
We classify borrowing purposes into three main categories: agricultural production, non-
agricultural production and consumption. Almost 60% of the sample consists in production 
loans, which are used for specific purposes of investments in physical assets, in contrast to 
consumption loans. Panel A of Table 6 also documents another split of all production loans in 
that  we  differentiate  into  conventional  investment  loans  and  loans  for  input  expenses. 
However, investment loans dominate the sample and the loans for input expenses are only 
slightly different regarding their characteristics. Their volume is a bit smaller, duration shorter 
and the interest rate higher, as it might be expected ex ante. Due to these minor differences we 
refer in the following more on the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural loans. 
Panel B of Table 6 shows the collateral requirements for different borrowing purposes. 
We  first  note  that  an  equal  number  of  loans  are  given  for  agricultural  production  and 
consumption whereas non-agricultural production loans account for 16 percent of total loans. 
Across all borrowing purposes, we see that a large share of loans is provided without tangible 
collateral. We also find that production loans are more likely to require land collateral, while 
consumption loans are less likely to require any collateral. This may be because production 
loans  are  larger  and  have  a  longer  duration  than  consumption  loans,  so  that  the  expected 
benefits cover the costs of pledging collateral. However the collateral to loan amount ratio is, 
on  average,  higher  for  consumption  loans  than  production  loans.  This  is  in  line  with  our 
expectation that loans  with non-specific purposes have to be secured  with more collateral 
because they are riskier. Other patterns are observed for shock-related borrowings and normal 
borrowings; shock-related borrowings are more likely to require any collateral, especially in 
the form of other assets, probably because borrowers who urgently need a loan represent more 
risky borrowers. Interestingly we find that the ratio of collateral to loan values is slightly lower 
for shock-related borrowings. A possible  explanation is that collateral  is substituted by or 




(d)  Collateral and loan terms  
Table  7  shows  the  average  term  of  credit  contracts  secured  by  different  types  of 
collateral. There seems to be a relationship between the types of collateral and loan terms. We 
find  that  conventional  collateral  is  related  to  larger  loan  size,  longer  duration,  and  higher 
interest rate. Note that the relation of collateral with high interest rate is influenced by the fact 
that the policy induced  low-interest rate loans of VF and POLICY  are extended basically 
without demanding collateral (see Tables 2, 4). With the exception of collateral-free loans, we 
find  an  inverse  relationship  between  the  marketability  of  collateral  and  interest  rates. 
According  to  Table  7,  the  interest  rates  are  lower  on  loans  secured  by  land,  the  most 
marketable collateral, and higher on loans secured by asset substitutes. We also look at loan 
requirements, in particular, whether the borrower is a member of the lending institution and 
whether  a  third  party  guarantee  is  required  to  get  a  loan.  We  find  that  the  proportion  of 
members and third party guarantees are higher for collateral-free loans than for loans backed 
by  land  or  asset  substitutes.  This  may  indicate  that  guarantees  and  close  bank-borrower 
relationships are substitutes to collateral. 
 
5  The use of collateral: regressions 
5.1  Baseline results 
In this section, we analyze which factors affect lenders’ decisions to give loans without 
any tangible collateral. We use the probit model to explain the incidence of collateral. 
In  our  baseline  regressions,  we  exclude  loans  from  the  lending  institutions  VF  and 
POLICY  from  our  analysis  because  the  collateral  policies  of  these  institutions  are 
institutionally fixed, i.e. loans are secured by third party guarantees. Alternatively we also 
exclude loans from two more lending institutions: CB, since the share of CB in rural credit is 
very small, and RELA, since relatives may provide loans based on altruism or trust but not 
based on economic lending criteria. 
The  analysis  is  performed  at  the  loan  level  because  we  observe  several  households 
borrowing multiple loans with varying loan terms from different sources. We account for the 
sampling design in our analysis to get the precise estimates. Thus we incorporate the effect of 
stratification, clustering and sampling weights when computing the variance, standard error, 
and confidence intervals. 
In all regressions, we control for loan term variables, household characteristics, default 
risk  and  borrower-lender  relationship.  Loan  term  variables  comprise  loan  size,  duration, 18 
 
 
interest rate, borrowing purpose, and whether a third party guarantee is required to obtain a 
loan.  
Household  characteristics  include  the  gender  of  the  household  head,  the  age  of  the 
household  head,  number  of  household  members  (measured  in  terms  of  adult  equivalence 
units), years of education of the household head, household annual income (measured per 
number  of  adult  equivalence),  and  the  amount  of  savings  in  the  corresponding  lending 
institution.  
Default risk is proxied by the value of loan defaults to total outstanding loans and the 
value of late repayments to total loans. We proxy the borrower-lender relationship by three 
variables: whether the borrower is a member of the lending institution (‘membership status’), 
whether the borrower has previously borrowed from the lender, and the number of lenders a 
borrower engages with to capture the exclusivity of the relationship. Finally a set of lender 
dummies is also included. 
Results  for  the  probit  estimations  are  reported  in  Table  8.  Column  (1)  of  the  table 
displays the results for the whole sample (CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA); column (2) for the 
sample of loans from BAAC, CRED, ML and RELA; column (3) for the sample of loans from 
BAAC, CRED and ML; and column (4) for the sample from CB and ML. 
Our regressions display interesting results with respect to the terms of credit contracts. 
Loan size and loan duration are positively related to both the incidence and the degree of 
collateral. This finding is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Degryse and Van Cayseele, 
2000, Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). Thus, the use of collateral in loans to Thai households 
may be low, because the loans are of small size and short duration. 
We find that the provision of collateral is negatively related to the interest rate, that is 
conventional collateral is required for a loan with a low interest rate. This finding is consistent 
with the function of collateral in increasing the lender’s expected return (Binswanger, 1982). 
Most of the previous studies do not include the loan rate as independent variable in estimations 
of  collateral,  because  it  is  assumed  to  be  endogenous.  Studies  that  take  into  account  the 
jointness of interest rate and collateral decisions by simultaneous equation models find that 
collateral has a significant positive effect on the interest rate, but that the interest rate does not 
have any significant effect on the probability of collateral (Brick and Palia, 2007, Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009). 
Production loans are more likely to require collateral than consumption loans, which 
cannot only be explained by larger size or duration. Other explanations are that production 19 
 
 
loans involve higher uncertainty of repayment, or that the assets used as collateral are inputs in 
the production process, serving as inside collateral to provide priority of debt claims. 
Our  main  interest  is  in  the  coefficient  of  the  third  party  guarantee.  The  effect  is 
significantly  negative  at  the  1  percent  level,  suggesting  that  a  loan  guarantee  acts  as  a 
collateral substitute and allows a lender to enforce collateral-free loans. 
We do not find a significant effect of savings on the use of collateral. Thus, savings do 
not act as a collateral substitute due to unlimited liability of self-employed households. A 
possible explanation is that some lending institutions do not accept savings (only ML, RELA 
and POLICY). 
In general, the borrower-lender relationship appears to be negatively related to the use of 
collateral. A very important element seems to be whether a borrower has ever borrowed from 
a lender. Having previously borrowed from a lender reduces the informational opaqueness and 
therefore  the  likelihood  of  pledging  collateral;  the  coefficient  is  not  significant  for 
specification (4), possibly because relationship is better covered by the number of lenders in 
this subsample. This result is consistent with most previous studies (e.g. Berger and Udell, 
1995, Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000, Chakraborty and Hu, 2006, Jiménez et al., 2006, 
Brick and Palia, 2007, Steijvers et al., 2010, Behr et al., 2011).
8 Both membership status and 
number of lenders have expected signs but are not significant. 
Regarding the effect of default risk, we do not find a significant effect of borrower’s 
default risk on the use and the degree of collateral. Household wealth and other household 
characteristics  appear  to  play  no  role  for  the  provision  of  collateral,  except  the  years  of 
education of the household head, which shows a negative influence. The lack of wealth effect 
is  not  completely  surprising.  One  may  argue  that  household  wealth  should  be  positively 
related to the provision of collateral as wealthier households have enough assets to pledge as 
collateral. However, household wealth may indicate lower default risk; thus poorer households 
may be required to pledge more collateral. The two effects may outweigh each other. Another 
possible explanation is related to the role of informal lenders. The informal lenders serve to 
solve this problem for the poor by giving loans without any collateral requirement but using 
informational advantages, social enforcement and collateral substitutes. Thus for the informal 
lenders,  wealth  plays  no  role  in  the  provision  of  collateral.  Given  the  prevalence  of  the 
informal lenders in the Thai rural credit markets, the effect of wealth on the provision of 
collateral would become less important.  
                                                            
8 In contrast, no significant effect of relationship duration on collateral was found for business loans in 
Thailand (Menkhoff et al., 2006). 20 
 
 
We  find  considerable  differences  between  lenders  with  respect  to  their  collateral 
requirements. As expected, CRED, ML and RELA are more likely to give loans without any 
collateral than BAAC. This is inconsistent with the lender-based theory of collateral (Inderst 
and  Mueller,  2007)
9,  but  in  line  with  the  hypothesis  that  the  informal  lenders  have 
informational advantages over the formal lenders by closer relationships and therefore do not 
need collateral as a substitute. Testing for equality of coefficients on these dummies, we find 
that  RELA  is  most  likely  to  offer  collateral-free  loans,  followed  by  ML,  CRED  and  CB. 
Surprisingly  our  results  show  that  CB  requires  less  collateral  than  BAAC.  This  result  is 
possibly driven by some special policy loans which are disbursed via those state banks which 
are included in CB. These policy loans usually require no land or asset substitutes as collateral. 
 
5.2  The use of substitutes to collateral 
The limited role of collateral in rural lending motivates to examine potential substitutes, 
i.e. in particular third party guarantees and relationship lending, in their relation to collateral in 
more detail. The following analyses are based on the probit regression results using all loans 
from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA (Column (1) of Table 8.) 
First,  we  examine  whether  and  to  which  degree  both  third-party  guarantee  and 
relationship lending, proxied by the incidence that the borrower is a previous customer of the 
lender,  influence  the  requirement  of  collateral.  Table  9  shows  that  both,  guarantees  and 
relationship lending, significantly reduce collateral needs. Clearly, third-party guarantees play 
a more important role than relationship lending. Holding other variables at their sample means 
(average household with average loan contract), the use of third-party guarantees decreases the 
probability  of  requiring  collateral  by  a  factor  of  0.54-0.57,  while  relationship  lending 
decreases the probability by only 0.07-0.10. Moreover, Table 9 shows that the effect of third-
party  guarantees  on  reducing  the  collateral  incidence  differs  according  to  the  presence  of 
relationship  lending,  and  vice  versa.  The  effect  of  relationship  lending  on  reducing  the 
provision of collateral is higher when a third-party guarantee is not used. This is in line with 
our expectation that the effect of relationship lending will be even stronger when a third-party 
guarantee is not present and vice versa (they substitute each other; related see also Behr et al., 
2010). 
Next  we  examine  the  importance  of  third-party  guarantees  and  the  borrower-lender 
relationship for different lenders (see also Table 9). First we still find that all types of lenders 
put more weight on the presence of a third-party guarantee rather than relationship lending. 
                                                            
9 Evidence consistent with this theory has been found by Jiménez et al. (2009) for Spanish banks. 21 
 
 
For  all  lenders,  the  use  of  a  third-party  guarantee  reduces  the  probability  of  providing 
collateral by almost five times the effect of relationship lending. The exception is RELA, 
where  the  effect  of  a  third-party  guarantee  is  equally  important  as  relationship  lending. 
Second, the third-party  guarantee has the strongest impact when loans are taken from the 
formal lenders, and the impact decreases with informal loans. For instance, the third-party 
guarantee reduces the probability of requiring collateral by a factor of 0.5 for loans from CB 
and BAAC, but only by 0.06 for loans from RELA. Third, with regard to the substitution 
effect  between  third-party  guarantees  and  relationship  lending,  we  find  that  the  effect  of 
relationship lending is stronger when a third-party guarantee is not present, except for BAAC. 
For BAAC, the substitution between third-party guarantees and relationship lending is weaker, 
possibly because both substitutes are already in intensive use at BAAC compared to the other 
lenders in our sample. 
Lastly we show in Figure 1 the marginal probability effects of third-party guarantee and 
relationship  lending  on  the  incidence  of  collateral  by  loan  size.  This  shows  whether  the 
substitution effects differ according to other circumstances, where these other conditions are 
captured here by the size of the loan. We expect that the effect of relationship lending may 
decrease with loan size as a larger loan implies that the lender would bear more loss if the loan 
default occurs. For third-party guarantee, we expect that the effect would be constant as the 
risk to the lender is transferred to the guarantor. Somewhat contrary to these expectations, we 
find that the effects of relationship lending and third-party guarantees are both quite constant 
and do not depend on the size of the loan. Obviously, relationship lending reduces collateral 
requirement in general, independently of loan size, so that the particular risk of a larger loan 
size may be addressed by other measures. Alternatively, our imperfect proxy for relationship 
lending may be responsible for this finding. 
Overall, we make the following contributions about the use of collateral substitutes: 
•  We find for our sample that a third-party guarantee is more important than relationship 
lending. 
•  Both substitutes help reducing the need for collateral independently of each other. 
•  The  third-party  guarantee  plays  a  more  important  role  for  formal  lenders  and  thus, 
implicitly, relationship lending is relatively more important for informal lenders. 
•  The marginal effects of the two considered substitutes on the probability of collateral 
provision do not depend on loan size. 
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This  section  tackles  several  possible  concerns  with  the  baseline  results.  First,  we 
experiment  with  a  further  disaggregation  of  collateral  into  land  and  other  assets.  The 
respective multinomial probit model explains the choice between land as collateral, the use of 
other assets as collateral and no collateral (Table 10).
10 Results are qualitatively unchanged 
compared to the baseline regression shown in Table 8. In a similar vein, we have explored 
further  variations  in  the  set  of  determinants  in  our  baseline  regressions,  including  the 
consideration of additional variables such as number of children or ratio of loans to assets, 
without interesting changes (results available on request). 
The second robustness test concerns the possible endogeneity problem. There may be an 
endogeneity problem as collateral pledging, interest rate  charged on a  loan, loan size and 
maturity may be jointly and endogenously determined, which may bias our results. To take 
into account the possible endogeneity of several loan contract features, one needs to use the 
simultaneous  equation  approach  with  well-identified  instrumental  variables.  However  it  is 
difficult to find such instruments that would not be related to collateral pledging. Alternatively 
we  check  the  robustness  of  our  results  by  estimating  the  reduced  form  equations  and 
comparing the results when loan rate, loan size and duration are taken into and out of each 
regression.  Results  reported  in  Table  11  show  that  the  parameter  estimates  do  not  differ 
significantly between these models, which suggest that endogeneity is not important
11. 
As a related aspect of possibly distorted regressions, we pick up the concern that our 
sample may be distorted due to a selection bias as loan granting does not result from a random 
process. In order to account for this we apply a standard Heckman correction procedure, where 
the selection equation is a loan approval equation: 
prob(yi = 1) = ax1i + bz1i + ei   
where  yi = 1 if loan i is approved and 0 if loan i is rejected 
  x1i = loan i’s variables including amount of loan applied, purpose of borrowing, type of 
lender to which a loan application is submitted 
  z1i = household’s characteristics 
The main equation of interest is the incidence of collateral: 
prob(wj = 1) = ax2j + bz2j + ej 
                                                            
10 Results are qualitatively unchanged if we use an ordered probit model, where we use “assets as 
collateral” as the medium category due to its lower degree of marketability compared to land as 
collateral (result available on request). 
11 Table 10-12 only report the robustness test using all loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML and RELA. 
Similar robustness tests are undertaken when excluding loans from CB and RELA and when estimating 
by ordered probit model but are not reported here. In summary, parameter estimates do not differ 
significantly when dropping the possible endogenous variables from the regressions. 23 
 
 
where  wj = 1 if collateral is pledged for loan j 
The selection equation provides some reasonable information about loan approval, such 
as a preference for production over consumption loans or a lower approval probability if late 
repayments have occurred (see Appendix). However, the main equation is virtually unaffected, 
indicating that the selection effect is not very important regarding the use of collateral. 
Third,  we  evaluate  the  robustness  of  our  results  with  respect  to  the  types  of  loans. 
Results from the baseline regression show that production loans are more likely to require 
collateral than consumption loans. We are interested in testing whether the effects of other 
variables remain unchanged when we split the sample into production and consumption loans, 
or whether the main results are largely driven by a particular type of loan. Table 12 reports the 
regression results for a sub-sample of all production loans (column 1) and consumption loans 
(column 4). The estimation results for both sub-samples are in line with the findings when we 
use the pooled sample. Most coefficient estimates have the same signs and significance. The 
null hypotheses of equal coefficients are rejected at 5 percent level, suggesting that the effects 
of other variables do not differ between production and consumption loans. 
In another effort to challenge the homogeneity of production loans we split this group of 
971 loans into 790 “investments”, i.e. loans for business investments, agricultural investments 
or investments into housing or land, and into 181 “expenses”, i.e. loans for the purpose of 
buying other inputs for the production process. The rationale behind this split is the idea that 
loans for expenses may be closer to lines-of-credit loans where relationship lending may play 
a relatively larger role (Chakraborty and Hu, 2006). The result in columns (2) and (3) indicates 
that this hypothesis is not supported by our data, possibly because we do not really observe 
lines-of-credit  loans.  We  note  that  the  variable  “loan  duration”  becomes  insignificant  for 
“expenses” loans, probably because by far most of these loans support agricultural expenses 
which are needed for one year with little variation. 
Fourth, we test the robustness of results with regard to subgroups of borrowers, each 
defined by specific characteristics. In particular, we distinguish according to loan size and 
household income. Regarding loan size, we split the sample into small and large loans at a 
loan size of 50,000 Baht, i.e. the value of loan size at the 75
th percentile. Table 13 shows that 
the results for small loans are very similar to the results for the total sample (see Table 8), 
which is expected as small loans dominate the total sample. Results for large loans become 
somewhat weaker regarding the loan terms where the variables “loan size” and “loan interest 
rate” turn insignificant. This may be due to much less variation in variables among the group 
of large loans. 24 
 
 
Regarding the household income, we rely on the classification of three income groups 
introduced above (see Table 5). Again, the rough structure of the three regressions presented 
in Table 14 follows the baseline regression (see Table 8). Due to the smaller sample sizes, 
tentatively fewer coefficients are statistically significant, and in some cases “new” variables 
may turn significant. However, we never get contradictory results. 
Our  final  robustness  test  concerns  the  consideration  of  possible  interaction  effects 
between the different tools that may be used as collateral substitutes and the creditworthiness 
of the borrower. Inconsistency in empirical results on collateral may be originated from not 
incorporating these interaction effects into the estimation (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). 
For example, relationship duration may reduce the likelihood of collateral pledging for low 
credit quality borrowers but have no significant impact for higher credit quality borrowers. To 
test the robustness of our main findings, we add the interaction terms between the different 
collateral substitutes and the creditworthiness of the borrower. We proxy for the credit risk of 
a borrower using the variable DEFAULT, which takes the value of one if a borrower ever had 
defaulted  on  a  loan,  and  zero  otherwise.  Results  reported  in  Table  15  indicate  that  the 
interaction terms are not significant and that the effects of the critical variables do not change 
after incorporating the interaction terms. 
 
6  Conclusions 
This paper examines the use of collateral in lending to relatively poor households in 
emerging  countries,  i.e.  this  research  targets  at  a  large  fraction  of  world-wide  population. 
Collateral  is  an  important  instrument  for  lending  institutions.  In  general,  collateral  limits 
potential losses to the lenders in case of loan defaults and reduces borrowers’ incentives to 
default. Due to opaque information and weak enforcement, theory suggests that the incidence 
of collateral is even higher in developing markets. This high importance of collateral results 
into  a  problem  for  poor  households  in  developing  countries:  collateral  requirements  are 
expected  to  be  particularly  high  for  this  group  but  their  ability  to  provide  collateral  is 
comparatively low. How do borrowers and lenders deal with this collateral puzzle? 
Our empirical examination yields three main findings. First, in describing the use of 
collateral, we find that conventional collateral is indeed rarely used and that most loans to poor 
households do not include any tangible assets as collateral. Remarkably, the lack of assets 
(which  could  serve  as  collateral)  does  not  seem  to  exclude  the  poor  from  credit  access, 
because they do not have a higher probability of credit rationing than the rich. Thus, the puzzle 
is “solved” by creating other means of credit enforcement than by relying on collateral, i.e. by 25 
 
 
collateral substitutes. In principle, the substitution mechanisms may also work in advanced 
markets. 
Our  second  main  finding  reveals  determinants  of  the  use  of  collateral:  lenders  can 
enforce  collateral-free  loans  through  third  party  guarantees  and  relationship  lending.  In 
particular, third-party guarantees and repeated borrowing from the same lender significantly 
reduce the pledging of collateral. Moreover, reducing loan size and duration and increasing the 
interest rate also substitute collateral. Our results do not show a significant impact of the 
borrower’s wealth, savings and default risk on the use of collateral. 
The dominant means of loan enforcement are reliance on guarantees and relationship 
lending  which  both  substitute  collateral  in  emerging  markets’  lending.  In  our  sample, 
guarantees  are  relatively  more  important  than  relationship  lending,  both  substitutes  work 
independently  of  each  other  and  thus  tend  to  substitute  each  other.  Moreover,  third-party 
guarantees are relatively more important at formal financial institutions that lend at arm’s 
length, and the marginal effect of these substitutes is independent of loan size. 
These results show the benefits of collateral and its substitutes for more favorable loan 
terms and for an easier access to finance. Although our data stem from a particular emerging 
market, the substitution process at work may well apply to other markets too. For example, 
whenever the ownership of land is not easily transferable as is the case in rural Thailand, there 
emerges a lack of conventional collateral and substitutes become particularly urgent. From a 
policy  perspective  it  seems  important  to  support  easier  collateralization  as  well  as  its 
substitutes  of  guarantees  and  relationship  lending.  The  analyses  show  that  more  available 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables of Sample Households 
  Low income  
(n = 936) 
Middle income 
(n = 587) 
High income  
(n = 663) 














Demographics             
Female headed household  0.28  0.01  0.28  0.02  0.23  0.02 
Married household head  0.77  0.01  0.77  0.02  0.80  0.02 
Age of household head (years)  55.43  0.47  55.30  0.67  52.95  0.51 
Years of education of household head (years)  4.58  0.06  4.67  0.08  5.77  0.14 
Number of adult equivalence  2.81  0.03  2.97  0.05  2.73  0.04 
Household size  3.98  0.06  4.21  0.07  3.77  0.07 
Number of children   1.43  0.04  1.38  0.05  1.05  0.04 
Occupation of Household Head             
Farmer  0.66  0.02  0.62  0.02  0.55  0.02 
Informal worker  0.08  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.08  0.01 
Formal worker  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.06  0.01 
Government official  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.09  0.01 
Business owner  0.05  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.13  0.01 
Economically inactive  0.18  0.01  0.17  0.02  0.09  0.01 
Wealth              
Area of owned land (hectre)  1.61  0.09  2.11  0.13  2.47  0.19 
Household annual income (Baht)  8,184  1,862  67,198  1,198  222,742  14,847 
Annual income per equivalence scale (Baht)  2,761  691  22,603  188  85,924  5,645 
Consumption expenditures (Baht)  64,930  2,393  68,709  2,281  106,742  5,460 
Food   25,441  883  26,794  1,041  35,204  1,589 
Non-food  39,489  1,794  41,915  1,653  71,538  4,666 
Total assets (Baht)  666,307  31,473  893,108  66,895  1,611,767  107,132 
Savings  9,836  1,394  12,209  1,221  43,592  5,534 
Livestock and stored crops  23,988  1,192  29,846  1,687  46,221  4,063 
Household durable goods  160,117  13,124  158,755  8,146  301,382  18,458 
Land and buildings  472,366  21,513  692,297  66,165  1,220,573  95,454 
Borrowing             
Dummy for borrowing  0.75  0.02  0.72  0.02  0.70  0.02 
Number of loans per household  1.61  0.07  1.44  0.07  1.44  0.07 
Volume of loans per household (Baht)  43,811  3,032  39,231  3,493  71,458  6,353 
Average interest rate per household (%)  17.26  5.33  11.89  1.28  10.70  1.50 
Weighted average interest rate per household (%)  9.97  2.45  8.26  1.10  7.24  1.49 
Credit Access              
Dummy for credit rationing  0.11  0.01  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.01 
Full rationing  0.07  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.04  0.01 
Partial rationing  0.05  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.01 
Dummy for loan default  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
Dummy for late repayment   0.12  0.01  0.11  0.01  0.08  0.01 
Value of loan defaults: total loans  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Value of late repayments: total loans  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.04  0.01 31 
Table 2: Loan Characteristics by Lending Institution 
Loan characteristics  CB  BAAC  VF  CRED  POLICY  ML  RELA 
No. borrowing households  57  569  1,076  336  147  194  192 
% of all borrowing households  3.6%  35.8%  67.8%  21.2%  9.3%  12.2%  12.1% 
No. loan items  61  757  1,427  436  165  227  225 
% of total loans items  1.8%  23.0%  43.3%  13.2%  5.0%  6.9%  6.8% 
Total credit value (mil Baht)  6.4  38.6  23.3  16.6  1.8  9.3  6.6 
% of total credit volume  6.2%  37.6%  22.7%  16.2%  1.7%  9.1%  6.4% 
Loan size (Baht)               
Mean    104,705  51,043  16,345  38,114  10,823  41,135  29,303 
Std. dev  136,776.7  58,356.0  9,366.6  91,127.6  32,849.6  75,704.7  58,063.7 
Loan duration (years)               
Mean    3.8  2.1  1.0  1.4  2.2  1.3  1.2 
Std. dev  5.4  2.8  0.4  1.4  3.2  1.4  1.6 
Interest rate (%)               
Mean    22.9%  9.5%  6.3%  11.1%  3.1%  55.0%  10.6% 
Std. dev  27.03%  12.45%  7.49%  14.56%  6.62%  75.16%  29.80% 
Weighted ave interest rate (%)               
Mean    21.4%  9.6%  6.1%  11.3%  3.9%  48.2%  9.0% 
Std. dev  23.7%  11.2%  6.8%  11.4%  6.2%  66.0%  26.8% 
Percentage of interest-free loans               
% of loan items  0.0%  1.1%  0.4%  6.2%  53.3%  2.6%  67.6% 
% of credit volume  0.0%  0.7%  0.2%  1.1%  41.2%  1.5%  54.4% 
Borrowing purpose (%)               
Farm production  21.3%  51.9%  44.9%  38.3%  37.6%  24.7%  24.4% 
Non-farm production  37.7%  18.4%  15.5%  13.1%  10.9%  15.0%  20.0% 
Consumption  39.3%  28.5%  38.5%  47.2%  50.9%  59.0%  55.1% 
Shock related borrowing (%)  9.8%  6.9%  6.5%  7.1%  6.7%  14.1%  23.6% 32 
Table 3: The Incidence of Collateral and Guarantees in Small Business and Consumer Loans 




US NSSBF 1993: 4,637 small firms (< 500 
empl.) 
(Avery et al., 1998) 
  Business and personal 
collateral 
Personal guarantee   Total   
Total loans  without guarantee: 49.5  
with guarantee: 30.0 
without collateral: 10.9 





Loans to unincorporated firms: 




- Equipment loans 
 
without guarantee: 10.3 
with guarantee: 7.4 
without guarantee: 34.6 
with guarantee: 23.2 
- 
 
without collateral: 31.7 
with collateral: 7.4 
without collateral: 15.9 
with collateral: 23.2 













Italy 2005: 300,000 firms, sole proprietor-
ships, consumer households 
(Calcagnini et al., 2009) 
Loans to all customers  42.7  15.7  58.4  41.6 
Loans to firms  32.2  23.6  55.8  44.2 
Loans to sole proprietorships  45.4  28.0  73.4  26.6 
Loans to consumer households (mostly 
mortgage loans) 
72.6  5.4  78.0  22.0 
Germany 2002: 230 professionals 
(Neuberger and Räthke, 2009) 
Investment loans   Real estate: 63.0 
Other assets: 20.0 
20.0  84.0  16.0 
Belgium: 248 small firms (mean number of 
empl.: 40) (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 
2006) 
Total loans  Business collateral:  57.26  Personal collateral and 
guarantees: 30.34 
87.6  12.4 
Thailand 
2006-2007: 2,186 rural households (present 
study) 
Total loans  15.0  71.0  86.0  14.0 
Agricultural production loans  Land:  14.7 
Other assets:  0.7 
     
Non-agricultural production loans  Land: 19.8 
Other assets: 4.9 
     
Consumption loans  Land: 8.2 
Other assets: 2.2 
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Table 4: Collateral by Lending Institution 
Type of collateral  CB  BAAC  VF  CRED  POLICY  ML  RELA 
Percentage of loans 
Land  27.9%  36.7%  0.4%  12.8%  0.6%  27.7%  5.8% 
Other assets  6.6%  1.1%  1.0%  3.4%  0.6%  9.4%  1.3% 
None  65.6%  62.3%  98.6%  83.7%  98.8%  62.9%  92.8% 
Mean value of collateral to loan size 
Land  2.89  4.32  2.01  5.57  1.12  4.56  5.32 
Other assets  27.19  1.03  1.02  1.06  6.58  2.09  1.00 
None  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Median value of collateral to loan size 
Land  1.75  2.65  1.94  3.17  1.12  3.00  4.90 
Other assets  3.50  1.07  0.05  0.50  6.58  1.18  1.00 
None  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Percentage of more than fully collateralized loans 
Land  76.5%  84.8%  66.7%  96.4%  100.0%  85.5%  92.3% 
Other assets  100.0%  50.0%  21.4%  26.7%  100.0%  57.1%  0.0% 




Table 5: Collateral by Income Group 






Percentage of loans 
Land  12.6%  11.8%  15.0% 
Other assets  1.9%  1.9%  2.3% 
None  85.4%  86.3%  82.7% 
Mean value of collateral to loan size 
Land  4.22  4.94  4.42 
Other assets  1.35  8.19  3.85 
None  0  0  0 
Median value of collateral to loan size 
Land  2.50  3.00  3.07 
Other assets  0.70  1.58  1.00 
None  0  0  0 
Percentage of more than fully collateralized loans 
Land  83.7%  83.8%  90.8% 
Other assets  34.5%  62.5%  40.9% 
None  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
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Table 6: Loan Types and Collateral by Borrowing Purpose          
Panel A: Loan Types by Borrowing Purpose 
Loan Characteristics  Type of Loan 
      Production    
Consump-
tion 
      All  Agricultural 
Non-
agric.  Investment 
Input 
expens.     All 
No. of loans  1,924  1,387  537  1,595  329  1,374 
Share of total loans  58.3%  42.1%  16.2%  48.3%  10.0%  41.7% 
Mean loan size (in Baht)  34,502  27,856  51,635  35,757  28,412  26,421 
Duration of loan   1.5  1.4  1.8  1.6  1.3  1.4 
(in years, mean) 
Interest rate (in %)  9.8%  9.2%  11.5%  9.6%  10.8%     13.7% 
Panel B: Collateral by Borrowing Purpose 
Collateral type  Borrowing purpose  Shock-related borrowing 
Agricultural  Non-   Consumption  No  Yes 
production  agricultural 
         production          
percentage of loans 
Land   14.7%  19.8%  8.2%  13.0%  13.7% 
Other assets  0.7%  4.9%  2.2%  1.9%  3.2% 
None  84.6%  75.4%  89.6%  85.0%  83.1% 
mean value of collateral to size 
Land   4.58  3.91  4.96  4.52  3.71 
Other assets  0.87  1.75  6.68  4.09  1.95 
None  0  0  0  0  0 
median value of collateral to size 
Land   3.00  2.50  3.08  2.86  2.63 
Other assets  0.97  1.08  1.00  1.00  1.50 
None  0  0  0  0  0 
percentage of more than fully collateralized loans 
Land   88.2%  85.8%  81.7%  86.8%  78.9% 
Other assets  30.0%  50.0%  43.3%  37.9%  77.8% 




Table 7: Loan Terms by Type of Collateral 
Type of 
collateral 















Land  77,563  2.98  13.08  25.29%  70.30%  54.76%  65.89% 
Other assets  44,522  1.71  24.30  44.78%  43.28%  25.37%  55.22% 
None  23,604  1.21  10.78  42.83%  80.32%  85.37%  80.57% 
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Table 8: Probit Regression Results for the Incidence of Collateral 
Incidence of Collateral 
                          Marginal Probability                       
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Loan terms         
Loan size  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Loan duration  0.037**  0.039**  0.048**  0.020** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Loan interest rate  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.002**  -0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Agricultural production loan  0.062*  0.056*  0.074**  0.004 
  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.037)  (0.028) 
Non-agricultural production loan  0.154**  0.152**  0.191**  0.119** 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.052)  (0.091) 
Third party guarantee requirement  -0.551**  -0.564**  -0.575**  -0.257** 
  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.052)  (0.101) 
Household characteristics         
Female headed household  0.016  0.023  0.007  0.012 
  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.044)  (0.029) 
Age of household head  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Adult equivalence units  -0.012  -0.009  -0.010  -0.012 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Years of education of household head  -0.013**  -0.012*  -0.019**  -0.003 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Income per adult equivalence  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Amount of savings in lending institution  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Default risk         
Ratio of loan default to total loans  0.007  0.014  -0.270  -0.131 
  (0.150)  (0.148)  (0.169)  (0.123) 
Ratio of late repayments to total loans  0.097  0.075  0.086  0.022 
  (0.076)  (0.085)  (0.103)  (0.049) 
Borrower-Lender relationship         
Membership  -0.073  -0.054  -0.063  -0.052 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.063)  (0.065) 
Ever borrowed  -0.094**  -0.091**  -0.120**  -0.030 
  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.044)  (0.027) 
Number of lenders a household engaged with  0.022  0.019  0.016  0.025** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
Lender dummy, CB  -0.185**       
  (0.034)       
Lender dummy, CRED  -0.219**  -0.221**  -0.256**   
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.028)   
Lender dummy, ML  -0.240**  -0.241**  -0.284**  -0.012 
  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.032) 
Lender dummy, RELA  -0.297**  -0.302**     
  (0.023)  (0.023)     
No. Obs  1,671  1,610  1,400  280.000 
PseudoR
2  0.283  0.277  0.279  0.301 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  425.129(23)  419.910 (22)  314.532 (22)  76.043 (20) 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of marginal probabilities in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05. 
(2) Column (1) includes loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA; Column (2) includes BAAC, CRED, ML, 
RELA; Column (3) includes BAAC, CRED, ML; Column (4) includes CB and ML. 









Predicted probability of requiring collateral 






Never borrowed  0.78  0.21  -0.57 
Ever borrowed  0.68  0.14  -0.54 
Difference  -0.10  -0.07   
CB 
Never borrowed  0.62  0.10  -0.51 
Ever borrowed  0.50  0.06  -0.44 
Difference  -0.11  -0.04   
BAAC 
Never borrowed  0.88  0.35  -0.53 
Ever borrowed  0.81  0.25  -0.56 
Difference  -0.07  -0.10   
CRED 
Never borrowed  0.58  0.09  -0.49 
Ever borrowed  0.47  0.05  -0.42 
Difference  -0.11  -0.04   
ML 
Never borrowed  0.45  0.04  -0.40 
Ever borrowed  0.34  0.02  -0.31 
Difference  -0.11  -0.02   
RELA 
Never borrowed  0.06  0.00  -0.06 
Ever borrowed  0.03  0.00  -0.03 




Table 10: Multinomial Probit Regression Results for the Use of Different Collateral 
Use of different collateral 
Marginal Probability 




Loan terms       
Loan size  -0.000**  0.000  0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Loan duration  -0.036**  0.001  0.035** 
  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.006) 
Interest rate  0.002**  -0.000  -0.002** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Agricultural production loan  -0.063**  -0.009*  0.072** 
  (0.031)  (0.005)  (0.031) 
Non-agricultural production loan  -0.142**  0.033**  0.109** 
  (0.043)  (0.014)  (0.042) 
Third party guarantee requirement  0.495**  -0.047**  -0.447** 
  (0.053)  (0.017)  (0.055) 
Household characteristics       
Female headed household  -0.012  0.004  0.008 
  (0.034)  (0.005)  (0.034) 
Age of household head  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Equivalence scale  0.012  0.000  -0.012 
  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.013) 
Years of education of household head  0.012**  -0.001  -0.011** 
  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.006) 
Income per equivalence scale  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Amount of savings in lending institution  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Default risk       
Ratio of loan default to total loans  0.045  0.020  -0.065 
  (0.120)  (0.027)  (0.115) 
Ratio of late repayments to total loans  -0.090  0.007  0.083 
  (0.071)  (0.011)  (0.068) 
Borrower-Lender relationship       
Membership  0.069  -0.002  -0.067 
  (0.052)  (0.010)  (0.050) 
Ever borrowed  0.086**  -0.006**  -0.080** 
  (0.036)  (0.005)  (0.035) 
Number of lenders  -0.020  0.003  0.017 
  (0.014)  (0.002)  (0.014) 
Lender dummy, CB  0.168**  0.006  -0.174** 
  (0.034)  (0.016)  (0.029) 
Lender dummy, CRED  0.231**  0.004  -0.235** 
  (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.020) 
Lender dummy, ML  0.239**  -0.002  -0.237** 
  (0.027)  (0.010)  (0.024) 
Lender dummy, RELA  0.328**  -0.016**  -0.312** 
  (0.019)  (0.006)  (0.019) 
No. Obs  1,196  51  424 
Notes: 
(1) Standard errors of marginal probabilities in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05. 
(2) The sample reported in this table includes loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA. 
(3) Province dummies are considered. 38 
 
 
Table 11: Probit Regression Results for the Incidence of Collateral - Modified 
Incidence of Collateral 
Marginal Probability 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
Loan terms         
Loan size    0.000**  0.000**   
    (0.000)  (0.000)   
Loan duration  0.047**    0.037**   
  (0.006)    (0.006)   
Interest rate  -0.001**  -0.001**     
  (0.001)  (0.001)     
Agricultural production loan  0.061*  0.066**  0.065**  0.072** 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Non-agricultural production loan  0.181**  0.160**  0.155**  0.211** 
  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.047) 
Third party guarantee requirement  -0.551**  -0.549**  -0.546**  -0.546** 
  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.050) 
Household characteristics         
Female headed household  0.009  0.020  0.016  0.006 
  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Age of household head  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Equivalence scale  -0.009  -0.010  -0.013  -0.006 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Years of education of head  -0.010*  -0.012**  -0.013**  -0.007 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Income per equivalence scale  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Amount of savings   -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Default risk         
Ratio of loan default to total loan  -0.016  0.015  0.010  -0.012 
  (0.155)  (0.149)  (0.152)  (0.158) 
Ratio of late payment to total loan  0.088  0.119  0.096  0.107 
  (0.075)  (0.087)  (0.076)  (0.085) 
Borrower-Lender relationship         
Membership  -0.075  -0.074  -0.071  -0.074 
  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.058) 
Ever borrowed  -0.092**  -0.113**  -0.090**  -0.109** 
  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
Number of lenders  0.024  0.021  0.023  0.025 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Lender dummy, CB  -0.179**  -0.182**  -0.189**  -0.175** 
  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.043) 
Lender dummy, CRED  -0.222**  -0.237**  -0.217**  -0.247** 
  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Lender dummy, ML  -0.246**  -0.255**  -0.247**  -0.281** 
  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
Lender dummy, RELA  -0.308**  -0.312**  -0.293**  -0.331** 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
No. Obs  1671  1671  1671  1671 
PseudoR
2  0.269  0.260  0.279  0.227 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  436.679 (22)  397.465 (22)  411.028 (22)  393.711 (20) 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of marginal probabilities in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05. 
(2) The sample reported in this table includes loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA. 
(3) Province dummies are considered. 39 
 
 
Table 12: Probit Regression Results for the Incidence of Collateral by Purpose of Loan 
                                                                         Marginal Probability 












Loan terms         
Loan size  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Loan duration  0.040**  0.045**  0.011  0.037** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.009) 
Interest rate  -0.001  -0.002  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Third party guarantee requirement  -0.562**  -0.561**  -0.616**  -0.533** 
  (0.059)  (0.070)  (0.135)  (0.076) 
Household characteristics         
Female headed household  0.009  0.045  -0.176**  0.052 
  (0.049)  (0.058)  (0.069)  (0.044) 
Age of household head  0.000  0.000  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Equivalence scale  -0.005  -0.015  0.017  -0.024 
  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.036)  (0.018) 
Years of education of household head  -0.013*  -0.015*  -0.013  -0.011 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.009) 
Income per equivalence scale  0.000*  0.000*  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Amount of savings in lending institution  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Default risk         
Ratio of loan default to total loans  0.218  0.335  -0.548  -0.380 
  (0.236)  (0.263)  (0.704)  (0.258) 
Ratio of late repayments to total loans  0.110  0.079  0.221  0.024 
  (0.132)  (0.140)  (0.426)  (0.087) 
Borrower-Lender relationship         
Membership  -0.106  -0.122  -0.118  -0.028 
  (0.083)  (0.091)  (0.201)  (0.071) 
Ever borrowed  -0.111**  -0.140**  -0.067  -0.069* 
  (0.051)  (0.058)  (0.109)  (0.043) 
Number of lenders  0.017  0.009  0.038  0.021 
  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.042)  (0.019) 
Lender dummy, CB  -0.182**  -0.196**  -0.144  -0.160** 
  (0.060)  (0.064)  (0.080)  (0.032) 
Lender dummy, CRED  -0.237**  -0.243**  -0.182**  -0.177** 
  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.070)  (0.031) 
Lender dummy, ML  -0.277**  -0.285**  -0.228**  -0.179** 
  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.061)  (0.032) 
Lender dummy, RELA  -0.339**  -0.360**  -0.249**  -0.228** 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.063)  (0.028) 
No. Obs  971  790  181  700 
PseudoR
2  0.299  0.304  0.375  0.248 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  237.644 (21)  180.853 (21)  50.683 (21)  150.095 (21) 
Notes: 
(1) Standard errors of marginal probabilities in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05. 
(2) The sample reported in this table includes loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA. 
(3) Province dummies are considered. 40 
 
 
Table 13: Probit Regression Results for the Incidence of Collateral by Loan Size 
Incidence of Collateral  Marginal Probability 
Small loan  Large loan 
Loan terms     
Loan size  0.000**  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Loan duration  0.033**  0.041** 
  (0.008)  (0.010) 
Loan interest rate  -0.001*  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Agricultural production loan  0.038  0.087 
  (0.043)  (0.069) 
Non-agricultural production loan  0.083  0.247** 
  (0.056)  (0.082) 
Third party guarantee requirement  -0.512**  -0.635** 
  (0.065)  (0.062) 
Household characteristics     
Female headed household  0.059  -0.071 
  (0.044)  (0.076) 
Age of household head  0.000  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Adult equivalence units  -0.015  -0.028 
  (0.018)  (0.030) 
Years of education of household head  -0.001  -0.033** 
  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Income per adult equivalence  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Amount of savings in lending institution  -0.000  -0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Default risk     
Ratio of loan default to total loans  0.058  1.915 
  (0.165)  (1.828) 
Ratio of late repayments to total loans  0.100  0.130 
  (0.122)  (0.245) 
Borrower-Lender relationship     
Membership  -0.073  -0.212 
  (0.066)  (0.141) 
Ever borrowed  -0.123**  -0.143* 
  (0.042)  (0.083) 
Number of lenders a household engaged with  0.010  0.047 
  (0.021)  (0.035) 
Lender dummy, CB  -0.201*  -0.292** 
  (0.060)  (0.089) 
Lender dummy, CRED  -0.172**  -0.232** 
  (0.037)  (0.070) 
Lender dummy, ML  -0.226**  -0.399** 
  (0.043)  (0.067) 
Lender dummy, RELA  -0.307**  -0.528** 
  (0.031)  (0.051) 
No. Obs  1,183  488 
PseudoR
2  0.228  0.347 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  257.911 (23)  142.121 (23) 
Notes: 
(1) Standard errors of marginal probabilities in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05. 
(2) The sample reported in this table includes loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA. 
(3) Province dummies are considered. 
(4) We use 50,000 baht as the cut-off point for large loan as this is the value of loan size at 75
th percentile. 41 
 
 
Table 14: Probit Regression Results for the Incidence of Collateral by Income Group 
Incidence of Collateral  Marginal Probability 
Low income  Middle income  High income 
Loan terms       
Loan size  0.000**  0.000**  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Loan duration  0.041**  0.020**  0.054** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Loan interest rate  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Agricultural production loan  0.022  0.141**  0.014 
  (0.044)  (0.058)  (0.066) 
Non-agricultural production loan  0.150**  0.225**  0.073 
  (0.067)  (0.087)  (0.071) 
Third party guarantee requirement  -0.574**  -0.554**  -0.627** 
  (0.080)  (0.084)  (0.077) 
Household characteristics       
Female headed household  0.049  0.055  -0.076 
  (0.051)  (0.059)  (0.054) 
Age of household head  0.000  -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Adult equivalence units  -0.028  -0.014  0.042* 
  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.023) 
Years of education of household head  -0.017  -0.017  -0.019** 
  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.010) 
Income per adult equivalence  -0.000  0.000  0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Amount of savings in lending institution  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Default risk       
Ratio of loan default to total loans  0.032  0.016  0.201 
  (0.266)  (0.189)  (0.342) 
Ratio of late repayments to total loans  -0.041  0.108  0.247 
  (0.134)  (0.144)  (0.166) 
Borrower-Lender relationship       
Membership  0.071  -0.196  -0.302** 
  (0.073)  (0.140)  (0.120) 
Ever borrowed  -0.127**  -0.093  -0.070 
  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.050) 
Number of lenders a household engaged with  0.002  0.071**  0.015 
  (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Lender dummy, CB  0.057  -0.169**  -0.233** 
  (0.117)  (0.062)  (0.036) 
Lender dummy, CRED  -0.204**  -0.189**  -0.244** 
  (0.034)  (0.053)  (0.042) 
Lender dummy, ML  -0.224**  -0.237**  -0.256** 
  (0.046)  (0.061)  (0.038) 
Lender dummy, RELA  -0.286**  -0.278**  -0.299** 
  (0.037)  (0.064)  (0.042) 
No. obs  756  406  509 
PseudoR
2  0.342  0.288  0.351 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  292.256 (23)  156.035 (23)  157.115 (23) 
Notes: 
(1) Standard errors of marginal probabilities in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05. 
(2) The sample reported in this table includes loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA. 




Table 15: Probit Results for the Incidence of Collateral – Adding Interaction Terms 
Incidence of collateral  Marginal 
probability 
Loan terms   
Loan size  0.000** 
  (0.000) 
Loan duration  0.036** 
  (0.006) 
Interest rate  -0.001** 
  (0.001) 
Agricultural production loan  0.058* 
  (0.032) 
Non-agricultural production loan  0.154** 
  (0.045) 
Third party guarantee requirement  -0.542** 
  (0.054) 
Household characteristics   
Female headed household  0.014 
  (0.035) 
Age of household head  -0.000 
  (0.001) 
Equivalence scale  -0.010 
  (0.014) 
Years of education of household head  -0.013** 
  (0.006) 
Income per equivalence scale  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Amount of savings in lending institution  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
Default risk   
Ratio of loan default to total loans  -0.039 
  (0.263) 
Ratio of late repayments to total loans  0.099 
  (0.073) 
Borrower-Lender relationship   
Membership  -0.088 
  (0.057) 
Ever borrowed  -0.100** 
  (0.039) 
Number of lenders  0.022 
  (0.014) 
Lender dummy, CB  -0.182** 
  (0.034) 
Lender dummy, CRED  -0.216** 
  (0.023) 
Lender dummy, ML  -0.240** 
  (0.025) 
Lender dummy, RELA  -0.296** 
  (0.022) 
Interaction terms with DEFAULT   
loan size*DEFAULT  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
loan duration*DEFAULT  0.023 
  (0.024) 
interest rate*DEFAULT  -0.001 43 
 
 
  (0.003) 
third party guarantee*DEFAULT  -0.235 
  (0.045) 
amount of savings*DEFAULT  0.000 
  (0.000) 
membership*DEFAULT  0.353 
  (0.334) 
ever borrowed*DEFAULT  0.181 
  (0.169) 
No. Obs  1671 
PseudoR
2  0.289 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  466.820 (30) 
Notes: 
(1) Standard errors of marginal probabilities in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05. 
(2) The sample reported in this table includes loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA. 





Figure  1:  Marginal  Probability  Effects  of  Third-party  Guarantee  and  Relationship 











































Appendix: Selection equation of a Heckman correction to the baseline regression (T.8) 
 
Selection equation: whether a loan 
application is approved 
Coefficients 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Amount of loan applied  8.21e-08  -1.01e-07  -7.82e-07 
  1.08e-06  1.05e-06  1.14e-06 
Use of applied loan: agricultural production 
loan  .3491842**  .3521119**  .3182576* 
  .1485795  .1496445  .1822981 
Use of applied loan: non-agricultural 
production loan  .297182  .3716857*  .3946637* 
  .1877722  .2025145  .2359604 
Female headed household  .0394631  .036046  .1062159** 
  .0300564  .0300667  .0427363 
Age of household head  -.1117575  -.131802  .0000953 
  .1379287  .1372739  .1622595 
Adult equivalent units  .008478  .0126954  .0561658 
  .0628577  .0641772  .0712426 
Years of education of household head  -.0033481  -.0032742  .0007874 
  .0046128  .0046657  .0058106 
Income per adult equvalent unit  1.76e-06  2.12e-06  3.51e-06 
  2.09e-06  2.16e-06  2.64e-06 
Ratio of loan defaults to total loans  -.5245933  -.5323203  .1468006 
  .4340373  .434817  .6089177 
Ratio of late repayments to total loans  -.6238908**  -.6429599**  -.8437043** 
.2485567  .2510956  .2978337 
Lender dummy, CB  -.0792683 
  .4411793 
Lender dummy, CRED  .1264045  .1252725  .0950518 
  .1967072  .197092  .204941 
Lender dummy, ML  -.9688113**  -.9683051**  -1.017661** 
  .1501941  .1514195  .1540741 
Lender dummy, RELA  -.6417676**  -.6435424** 
  .1619623  .162254 
No. Obs  1,746  1,684  1,455 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of marginal probabilities in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05. 
(2) Column (1) includes loans from CB, BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA; Column (2) includes loans 
from BAAC, CRED, ML, RELA; and Column (3) includes loans from BAAC, CRED, ML.  
(3) Province dummies are considered. 
 